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ABSTRACT
Hedonic pricing is used to value certificates of plant variety protection for 
soybean seed in New York. The estimated price premium of 2.3 percent (.7 e/lb.) is 
low, and another indicator that US Plant Breeders' Rights protection likely provides 
inadequate incentives for breeding investment. Soon the Congress will decide on 
amending the Plant Variety Protection Act to strengthen protection. The current 
results suggest strengthening is needed, but additional study is required to 
determine if the proposed amendments are optimal.
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VALUATION OF PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION CERTIFICATES
Since 1970 the United States has granted certificates of plant variety 
protection, patent-like protection for open pollinated plant varieties1. Initially the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) (7 USC Sec. 2321 et seq.) was passed with little 
public attention, but a few minor amendments2 adopted in December 1980 were 
proceeded by an outpouring of public concern and disapproval (summary in 
Claffey). The issues raised incorporated matters of seed prices, dominance of the 
breeding sector by private firms, food prices, structure of farming and related issues, 
many of which have been more recently voiced in conjunction with biotechnology. 
Additionally, and of particular interest here, the concentration of certificates within 
a relatively small number of private firms was noted. Size economies in breeding 
and/or securing protection could lead to concentration in the sector. In response the 
Department of Agriculture, which houses the Plant Variety Protection Office 
(PVPO), the administrative body, commissioned a study of the first ten years under 
the Act (Butler and Marion). That study, while urging the maintenance of public 
breeding as a source of competition, found few of the major fears were realized in 
practice (see below).
Over a score of years later UPOV, the international convention, adopted a 
revised 1991 convention incorporating several potentially major changes. In brief 
these include a national option for dropping "Farmers' Exemption", and the 
creation of 'dependency' rights (see below). The US, a signatory to the 1978 
convention, must now decide whether or not to accede to this new version. Such 
changes have been proposed by Senator Kerrey as an amendment to the PVPA, the 
first step to ratification.
The purpose of this article is the measurement of the economic value of 
certificates of plant variety protection, the return to certificate holders beyond that 
explainable by yield differences and other variety characteristics. If the premium is 
"large" the PVPA in its present form is interpreted as providing notable investment 
incentives. A small premium, however, suggests the current incentive may be 
inadequate to bring forth a socially optimal level of investment in plant breeding3. 
UPOV's 1991 convention enhances the level of PVP and thereby provides one 
means of strengthening the present Act. The results presented here, while
^sexually propagated plants are protectable under the Plant Patent Act of 1930, incorporated into the 
Patent Act of 1954 (35 USC Sec. 161-2).
Principally an extension of protection to vegetables and lengthening of the duration of protection to 18 
years so that the US would qualify for membership in UPOV, the international convention, which was 
subsequently joined.
■^Investment will come from both private firms and universities which use the royalties from protected 
varieties to support breeding programs. For the case of Cornell University see Lesser 1987(a).
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insufficient in themselves for determining the appropriateness of the 1991 
Convention for serving the public interest in the US, will nonetheless be useful for 
legislators called upon to vote for or against the revisions. Their decision will be all 
the more complex in the present climate of ambivalence regarding 
agrobiotechnology even though in the US the two issues are not directly linked4.
The results indicate that the PVPA is associated with limited economic value, 
only a 2.3 percent price premium for soybean varieties in New York in 1993. If these 
results are replicated in other states, then there is reason to believe the PVPA needs 
strengthening5. There is, moreover, corroborative evidence that private firms are 
reducing the use of PVPA while seeking other more effective means for recovering 
their investments in plant breeding. With declining public funding for plant 
breeding, that trend by the private sector should be a matter of public attention.
Issues in Plant Variety Protection
Like patents, certificates of plant variety protection allow the owner to exclude 
others from variety use, allowing a period free from direct competition for 
recovering the research investment. Unlike patents, however, that right is limited 
in two significant respects, known as the breeders' exemption and the farmers' 
exemption. The breeders' exemption or privilege (7 USC Sec. 2544) explicitly allows 
breeders the right to use protected varieties for subsequent breeding and to sell the 
derivative varieties so long as ongoing use of the protected variety is not required 
(as with hybrids)6. The farmers' exemption (Sec. 2543) permits farmers to save and 
plant seed as well as to sell it in small quantities, but not by variety name. These 
two exemptions notably reduce the protection awarded compared to patents.
Farmer seed sales are particularly troubling for private firms7.
In another dimension as well, PVPA allows limited protection. This is the 
scope of protection, the degree of distinctiveness required (or close copying
4US Law and practice favor the patenting of products of biotechnology, including seeds, which will be 
unchanged by the revision of UPOV. However, European patent law contains a clause prohibiting the 
patenting of "plant or animal varieties" (European Patent Convention Article 53(b)) which, while not 
totally preventing the use of patents for seeds due to the interpretation of the term 'variety', does mean 
the dependency concept has more relevence for biotechnology there. For further information see e.g., 
OECD, Chap. VII; Crespi.
5That recommendation is made largely on theoretical grounds because the empirical relationship 
between aspects of intellectual property rights legislation and investment is poorly documented (see 
Lesser 1991, Ch. IV).
6There is no statutory research exemption in US or any other national patent law, although it is 
implicit. Bent argues that the allowable exemption is broad, but that interpretation is open to debate.
7It can be noted that the US is the only country to allow farmers to sell protected varieties while all 
members of UPOV presently permit farmers to reuse seed on their own farms.
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permitted) (Sec. 2401(a)(1)). In the US the distinctiveness requirement has been 
interpreted to be satisfied by any difference claimed by the applicant, however minor 
or unrelated to the intended uses of the plant8. For example, the distinct attribute of 
one soybean variety protected in 1991 was white flowers compared to the purple 
ones of a parent. The allowance of close substitutes encourages what has been called 
wasteful "cosmetic breeding". It also limits the monopoly power associated with 
intellectual property protection while reducing the incentive to invest in plant 
breeding.
These and other factors led Butler and Marion to conclude (p. 79), "Both 
benefits and costs appear to be modest. There is no evidence that PVPA has 
triggered massive investments in R&D. ... However, there is also little evidence of 
substantial public costs from PVPA." My own interpretation is that the industry 
overestimated the benefits of PVPA when, for example, increasing the number of 
soybean breeders from two in 1964 to 63 in 1984 (Brim Table 3). It is said that every 
major firm has a virtual copy of all competitors' varieties within a few years 
following release. Hence my earlier statement that the PVPA protects the variety 
name, not the germplasm itself (Lesser 1987(c)). Users, though, may not recognize 
the similarities across brands.
The 1991 UPOV revisions in part address these limitations by (a) making the 
farmers' exemption optional (Article 15(2)) and (b) introducing the concept of 
dependency (Article 14(5))9. Of these, the dependency notion is potentially the most 
far reaching and complex. Dependency allows the breeder of a protected base 
("initial") variety to control the commercialization of derivative ("essentially 
derived") varieties. Derivative varieties must retain the "expression of the essential 
characteristics ... of the initial variety" and may be created by "the selection of a 
natural or induced mutant ... or transformation by genetic engineering" (Article 
14(5)). Dependency rights are non-pyramiding; if A is the initial variety and B and C 
are derivative, then both B and C pay royalties to A10. But C cannot pay royalties to 
B, since B is already dependent. The definition and application of these terms is 
presently under study by a UPOV committee. Practical implications depend heavily 
on the outcome of that process. What is evident at this point is that the revised 
Convention will enhance the strength of protection, especially for those doing the
8In Europe the combination of statistical tests for establishing distinctiveness in the allowed 
dimensions and the separate EC marketing requirements for food crops means the situation there is quite 
different from the US. See Lesser 1987(b).
9Other notable changes not directly pertinent to the US are: (a) include a definition of variety (Article 
1 (vi)), (b) require that all genera and species be protectable within three years (Article 3), (c) drop the 
ban on double protection (Article 2), and (d) extend protection to the harvested materials of protected 
varieties and products made directly from harvested materials (Article 14 (2 and 3)).
10For a further discussion see Lesser 1993.
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longer term "background breeding", the introduction, for example, of genes from 
wild relatives11.
The balance of the factors involved is indeterminate at present and in all 
likelihood will not be known until and if the modification has been in place for 
some time. Legislators must then make a decision without much information on 
the likely consequences. In such an environment it would be valuable to know 
more about the effects of the existing PVPA legislation, and in particular if the 
incentives allowed appear either excessive or inadequate. The following analysis is 
intended to answer that question in part.
Empirical Analysis
The approach to be used here is the application of hedonic pricing analysis to 
1992 test data for soybean varieties in New York State. Hedonic pricing measures 
the marginal value attributed to variety traits by the market. In this instance the 
value of certificates of plant variety protection, distinct from other variety attributes 
like yield, is the factor of interest. A high value is indicative of strong protection 
while a low value suggests limited protection, potentially indicating inadequate 
stimulus for an optimal level of private investment.
Soybeans were selected for analysis because of their status as the leading 
recipient of PBR in the US. Foster and Perrin have shown that the attributes of a 
crop, especially its market value, explain the proportion of certificates issued. The 
choice of New York was purely a convenience matter. New York is not a major 
soybean producing state, so the results reported here should be replicated elsewhere 
for confirmation, but there is no available evidence that the NY soybean seed 
market functions notably differently from other areas.
The approach to hedonic pricing taken here is that of seeds as an input 
into the production process such that farmers will select varieties in accordance with 
their attributes12. The hedonic price function will then express price as a function of 
the variety attributes. Assume a competitive market with farms maximizing profits 
according to an input characteristic production function, fy(z). The first order 
conditions of the profit maximization problem with variety attribute arguments of 
the production function results in an hedonic price function:
m
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(1)
1 Gaucher is using game theory procedures to investigate the implications of dependency on the 
incentive to invest and on the exchange of technical knowledge, another associated factor.
12This material draws on Schroeder, Espinosa and Goodwin; broader literature review in Palmquest.
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where Px is the price of input x, Ry the price of output y, dzky/dxy is the marginal 
output of the kth attribute in the production of y from x, and Ry9fy/3zky the value of
the marginal product of attribute k in the production of y. The term Ry3fy/3zky is 
the hedonic price, the marginal implicit price of the kth attribute. Then according to 
(1), the price paid for a variety is equal to the sum of the implicit prices of the 
attributes of the variety multiplied by the marginal yields of those attributes.
As a simplifying step, assume the marginal yields and products are constant, 
that is that Ry3fy/3zky = Bk and 3zky/5xy = zkxy. Equation (1) then reduces to the 
linear hedonic pricing function:
Px — BkZkxy, (2 )
k=l
where Bk is the marginal implicit value of the attribute k and zkxy is the quantity of 
attribute k within each unit of input x entering the production function y.
Regressing variety prices on attributes (the zkxy's) gives an estimate of the 
contributions of the variety attributes to the price, that is, the implicit price of the 
attributes.
For soybean farmers the model can be described as:
PRICEi = ^.VkCik + a , (3)
with i identifying an individual variety, PRICE is price (in 50 pound bags), V the 
market value of the trait k (to be estimated), and C the quantity measure of trait k 
contributed by variety i. Finally, e is a random error term.
Soybean farmers in New York and other states have an unbiased source of 
information about the productive merits of competing varieties available in the 
form of public yield tests. These tests have the advantage of standardized treatment 
so that results can be compared across test locations and, to a lesser extent, states. For 
this study the NY test results for 1992 were used (Wright and Cox 1993). There, as 
elsewhere, private firms cover expenses for inclusion but public varieties are tested 
without charge. Data are provided on three relevant production characteristics, 
yield, proneness to lodging (increasing scale 1 to 5), and plant height. Disease 
resistance would be valuable information but is difficult to test on a systematized 
basis. Similarly, component content is not evaluated, largely because of the absence 
of a broad-based price premium system13. For the purpose of the analysis it is
13In 1992 Wright and Cox provided an irregular publication including additional attributes (color, 
disease prevalence and oil and protein composition) of the 1991 soybean trials. Regarding disease it 
was concluded, "The presence and severity of disease in the seeds was generally low in 1991" (p. 2).
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assumed these data are used in part in variety selection choices and that price 
differences across varieties reflect the different mix of attributes.
To those attributes were added two others, a bivariate measure (dummy 
variable) distinguishing between public and private varieties, and a bivariate 
variable indicating whether the variety was protected under PVPA. The designation 
of public (e.g., state experiment station) or private status was derived from the 
identified sponsor of the test (Wright and Cox 1993, p. 7). Public varieties are 
expected to be priced lower. The certification status was determined from the PVP 
Office Official Journal and recent mimeographed updates through August 1992. For 
certificates of plant variety protection to have a significant price impact this latter 
term must have a positive sign and be statistically significant. Note that this test 
indicates a premium associated solely with protected status and not explainable by 
yield and other measured attributes. Both public and private varieties in the sample 
have been protected. One adjustment to these data was made; varieties (four in the 
data set) with protection granted more than 10 years ago are treated as unprotected. 
This is done because the commercial life of soybean varieties is on the order of 
seven years and declining (Studebaker), and beyond a decade any protection 
premium would not be anticipated.
Data on variety prices were collected in spring 1993 from the breeders for 50 
pound bags of untreated seed with no early payment adjustments. Breeders 
supplied their wholesale price and shipment charge along with a "typical" dealer 
markup. Because of the source the price data do not necessarily represent the prices 
actually paid by individual farmers. However, it is felt these data better represent 
statewide prices than would figures from specific dealers. Moreover, spot checks of 
retail prices indicated variations of up to ± 10 percent of the price data used here. No 
systematic pattern regarding public, private or protected varieties was detected.
For the site selected (Aurora in Cayuga county; Wright and Cox 1993, Table 1), 
a total of 58 varieties were tested. Of those, seven were no longer sold or prices were 
unavailable. In addition, the eight Canadian varieties were eliminated because cold 
temperatures during the 1992 season combined with high quality standards meant 
seed for those varieties is not generally available to NY growers (M. Wright, 
personal communication), leaving a sample size of 43. The data are summarized in 
Table 1.
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Table 1: Data Characteristics
VARIABLE DEF MEAN RANGE EXPECTED
SIGN
SOURCE
PRICE Nat. log of 
price
$14.32 11.00-16.00 N /A Breeders
PUBLIC Public or
private
variety
.16 0-1 - Wright and 
Cox 1993, p. 7
PROT Protected 
variety under 
PVPA
.23 0-1 + PVPO O f f ic ia l  
Jo u r n a l
HEIGHT Variety
height
39.5 in. 33-45 + Wright and 
Cox 1993, 
Table 1
LODG Lodging
Proclivity
2.45 1-5 Wright and 
Cox 1993, 
Table 1
YIELD Yield, bu/acre 
Mean, four 
replicates per 
variety
55.17 bu/acre 38.6-67.7 + Wright and 
Cox 1993, 
Table 1
N /A  - not applicable - dependent variable
Using the natural log of prices to account for nonlinearities in the 
relationships, the regression results14 are shown in Table 2. In general the statistical 
fit is quite good, with an adjusted R2 of 45 percent and the entire equation significant 
at the 99 percent level. The target variable, PROT, has the expected sign as do 
PUBLIC and YIELD. HEIGHT and LODG have opposite from anticipated signs due 
to interactive effects; taller plants are desirable because lower pods are shaded, 
making harvest easier, but they tend to lodge more. The separation of those effects 
is not critical to the analysis but the results do indicate farmers are acting rationally 
(see below)15.
14The analysis was done using Data Desk v. 4.0 for the Macintosh.
l5Tauer (personal communication) suggested using a company dummy variable as a proxy for 
"reputation and general pricing strategy." In New York, however, the nationally better known brands 
(Asgrow, DeKalb, Pioneer, etc.) are applied almost exclusively to the late (Group II) maturity 
varieties, seemingly an attribute of the focus on the longer-season major soybean growing areas. 
However, short season variety growers in New York may use a different reputation index for their own 
somewhat specialized needs. Imposing an arbitrary selection of brands on the analysis could lead to 
results which would be difficult to interpret.
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Table 2: Regression Results
LPRICE = 1.20- .087PUBLIC + .023PROT - .005HEIGHT + .051LODG + .0002YIELD 
(12.6) (5.33) (1.74) (-1.89) (3.77) (.291)
R2 = 45% F = 7.95 N = 43
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
The PROT variable is significant at the 95 percent level (1-tailed test) and, 
with a positive sign, indicates that protected varieties do have a price premium 
beyond that explainable by yield and other factors16. The practical value of that 
premium, though, is small; protected varieties on average have only a 2.3 percent 
higher price, or 32 cents on a $14.00 bag. At that level over 9,000 bags must be sold 
just to recover the PVPO application fee! It is no wonder the private sector 
considers PVP certificates to be of low value and is seeking alternatives. Various 
approaches are being attempted, from patenting to the signing of use agreements by 
purchasers to supporting adoption of the 1991 UPOV convention as the American 
Seed Trade Association (ASTA), the national trade association, has done.
The disenchantment with PVPA cannot readily be seen in the decline of 
certificates granted. Some evidence is there - grants for soybeans down to 33 in 1991 
from 47 in 1988 (PVPO) - but due to annual variability the trend is not fully evident. 
Nor is it possible to examine the proportion of new varieties protected annually, as 
no figures exist on the number of variety releases. What is evident is the acreage of 
certified seed production, down a third to 639,000 acres over 1989-91 (Official Seed 
Cert. Agencies 1989 and 1991). PVPA allows applicants to specify that the "variety be 
sold by variety name only as a class of certified seed" (7 USC 2483(a)). This clause 
invokes the scrutiny of the national certified seed system as an enforcement 
mechanism, a valuable factor given the difficulty of detecting infringement. Yet its 
utilization fell from 30 percent of certificates in 1974-90 to less than five percent in 
1991 (PVPO) and is a further indication of a decline in interest in PBR.
The weak relationship between price and yield (Table 2) is an interesting 
aspect of the analysis but not directly relevant to the objectives of this article. 
Normally it would be expected that yield would be a principal variety attribute and 
closely correlated with price. There are several possible explanations as to why that 
is not the case. First, it needs be recognized that the data are from variety trials; 
some of the entered varieties perform poorly in New York and would not be 
expected to sell well. Second, annual weather variability means some varieties 
performed unusually poorly (or well) in 1992 in a way not reflected in relative 
prices. Third is the uniform pricing system of virtually all private and many public
16Separating statistically the protection effects from yield could be difficult. However there is no 
evidence in this sample of significant multicollinearity; the r = .22 and in a regression using YIELD as 
the dependent variable, PROT has a t-ratio of only 1.05.
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suppliers which utilizes a single list price regardless of individual variety attributes. 
Perhaps most likely, according to Pardee (personal communication), a long time 
observer of seed markets, is the difference in sales effort across brands. While some 
are offered through cooperatives and other outlets, many are sold by farmer-dealers 
who are effective salespeople. If this assessment is correct, then seed markets do not 
function as well as is often imagined. But the margin is likely small, as saved seed is 
a low cost substitute for purchased seed ("bin competition") and, given that seed 
costs are about three percent of production costs, the price differences among 
varieties is trivial even in a low margin business like farming. The fact nonetheless 
remains that farmers are loyal customers, whether due to risk minimization or 
personal commitment (see e.g., Schrader, Boynton and Liao).
The other unexpected result is the signs of the HEIGHT and LODG terms. 
These attributes are highly correlated (r = .63), as taller plants lodge more. Indeed, 
the purchaser is making an almost direct tradeoff, as one inch in height costs .5 
percent less, while a .1 increase in the lodging index increases price by the same 
amount. Thus while the data do not allow us to distinguish between the height and 
lodging effects, it is evident that the market prices these attributes efficiently.
Conclusions
The existence of certificates of PVP is associated with a statistically significant 
but practically insignificant price premium of 2.3 percent for soybean seed in New 
York in 1993. This analysis should be replicated for other crops and in other areas. If 
the results are substantiated, the 2.3 percent clearly is inadequate to support concerns 
about public performance problems associated with the PVP A, at least for soybean 
seed in New York. It is also insufficient for private firms to justify using PVP, and 
indeed supplementary information indicates a decline in its use. With easily-copied 
products like self pollinating seed, that trend suggests the PVPA provides 
inadequate incentives for private investment. In an era of declining public funding 
for agricultural research the public should be concerned about the sufficiency of 
investment in this critical area.
The 1991 UPOV convention, through the mechanism of dependency 
payments, provides a means of strengthening PVP. Other approaches include 
patenting, licensing, and increasing the distinctiveness requirement under PVPA. It 
exceeds the scope of this paper to consider the relative merits of these approaches, 
but they should be evaluated prior to acting on the 1991 convention. It appears the 
dissenters got it wrong; PVPA is not too strong, but rather too weak. Now comes the 
difficult question of what to do about it.
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